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"OTHER AcTs" EviDENcE: REcENT DEcisioNs BY THE CouRT oF APPEALS 
UNDERMINE THE EFFICACY OF MARYLAND RULE 5-404(b) 
by Lynn McLain* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Next to the hearsay doctrine, the darling of evidence 
afficionados is "character evidence." Its intricate turnings 
intrigue, 1 much as those in a maze. It is easy to make a 
wrong turn and find one's passage blocked by an 
impenetrable hedge; the challenge then is to backtrack 
and refine one's analysis so as to reach the through path. 
Unfortunately, in a few recent decisions, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has taken a couple of wrong turns 
and trapped our trial judges in the maze. This article is 
written to challenge the court of appeals to turn around 
and lead the way out. 
This article will discuss the rationale for the rules of 
evidence, both in general and with regard to those common 
law character evidence rules codified in Maryland Rule 
5-404(b ): the "propensity rule" and the admissibility of 
evidence of"othercrimes, wrongs, or acts." The article 
will provide an overview of the pre-1998 Maryland case 
law on "other acts" evidence. It then will critique the court 
of appeals' decisions in Wynn v. State in 1998, Streater 
v. State and Klauenberg v. State in 1999, and Sessoms 
v. State in 2000. These four cases have unnecessarily 
complicated what was already a challenging area of the 
law. The added complexities are out of step both with 
prior case law and with the text ofTitle 5 of the Maryland 
Rules, and bring no concomitant benefit to the 
ascertainment of the truth or the achievement of fairness 
• J.D., Duke University School ofLaw, 1974; Member, 
Maryland Bar; Professor of Law and Dean Joseph Curtis 
Faculty Fellow, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., PAUL W. GRIMM & MATIHEW G. HJORSTBERG, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL § 4.3 
( 1997); LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EviDENCE: STATE AND 
FEDERAL§§ 404.1-405.5 (2d. ed. 2001) (and sources cited 
therein); JosEPH F. MuRPHY, JR., MARYLAND EviDENCE 
HANDBOOK§§ 509-510(E)(6) (3d ed. 1999). 
and justice. 
II. PURPOSES OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
IN GENERAL, THE "PROPENSITY RULE," AND 
MARYLAND RULE 5-404(b) 
Our trial system is intended to provide a forum where 
we can peacefully resolve disputes and redress wrongs. 
In recognition of the fact that the unrestricted admission of 
evidence would so overwhelm the courts as to make them 
ineffective, the rules of evidence are intended to help 
achieve maximum fairness with a minimum expenditure of 
time and judicial resources. Rule 5-102 articulates the 
purposes ofMaryland's evidentiary rules as follows: "The 
rules in this Title shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, 
and promote the growth and development of the law of 
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and 
proceedings justly determined.''2 
One way in which the rules attempt to further these 
goals is by minimizing appeals on evidentiary issues. Rule 
5-103 requires generally that a timely objection to evidence 
must be made at trial in the hope that the question can be 
properly resolved there. Absent such an objection, a party 
may not complain on appeal that the admission of the 
evidence was erroneous. 
The most basic and most time-saving rule of evidence, 
which is codified in Ru1e 5-402, excludes evidence that is 
irrelevant to the matter at hand. The other, more specific 
rules restrict the admission of relevant evidence. For 
example, Rule 5-407limits the admissibility of evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures, and Rule 5-404 
circumscribes the admissibility of character evidence. 
The considerations that led to the development of 
2 MD. RuLE 5-102. In the text of this Article, a Maryland Rule 
will be referred to as "Rule," and a Federal Rule ofEvidence will 
be referred to as "FRE." 
31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 5 
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these and other specific rules are summarized explicitly in 
Rule 5-403, the "clean-up batter" ofTitle 5. Even if no 
other rule excludes particular evidence, the trial judge 
nonetheless has the discretion to exclude it under Rule 5-
403, which provides: "Although relevant, evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."3 
These general considerations enumerated in Rule 5-
403 are also reflected in the specific common law rules 
codified in Rule 5-404(b ). The first sentence ofRule 5-
404(b) sets forth the general "propensity rule" of exclusion 
of evidence of other acts when offered merely to show 
that the actor has acted similarly, or "in character," this 
time. The second sentence sets forth the permissibility of 
admission of such evidence for other, more specific 
purposes. Rule 5-404(b) provides: "Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. "4 
The general ''propensity rule" of exclusion of evidence 
to prove that a person has a "good" or "bad" character 
and therefore is somewhat more likely to have acted in a 
"good" or "bad" way is not premised on a total lack of 
relevance.5 If the evidence were irrelevant, Rule 5-402 
would exclude it; the first clause of Rule 5-404( a)( 1 )6 and 
the frrst sentence ofRule 5-404(b) would be unnecessary. 
3 Mo. RuLE 5-403. 
4 Mo. RULE 5-404(b). 
5 E.g., Harris v. State, 324 Md. 490,495-96,597 A.2d 956,959-60 
(1991). 
6 Rule 5-404(a)( 1) provides: "(1) In General. Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait or character is not admissible for 
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion .... " 
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As the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
The inquiry is not rejected because character is 
irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too 
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them 
as to prejudge one with a bad general record 
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against 
a particular charge. The overriding policy of 
excluding such evidence, despite its admitted 
probative value, is the practical experience that 
its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of 
issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice. 7 
Rule 5-404(b) recognizes that "other acts" evidence 
has relevance, but that the strength of its probative value 
will vary. The lower the probative value, the higher the 
risk of unfair prejudice. For example, the fact that an 
accused once stole $20 from his sick grandmother's 
pocketbook to buy beer is not strongly probative that he 
is thus more likely to have assaulted and raped a stranger 
six years later. Any slight probative value the earlier theft 
may have concerning his disregard for the law is substantially 
outweighed by its potential to unfairly prejudice the jury 
against him, for reasons of "bad character" entirely 
unrelated to the issues at hand. 
The second sentence of Rule 5-404(b) codifies the 
common law rule that evolved in recognition that the higher 
the probative value ofthe evidence -- that is, the stronger 
and more logically persuasive the evidence is of the point 
it is offered to help prove --the lesser the risk of unfair 
prejudice. 8 When the issue is sharpened, and the "other 
acts" evidence is probative not just of general character 
but is relevant to the narrower issue, "such as,"9 but not 
limited to, those listed in the second sentence ofRule 5-
404(b ), the probative value is likely to be higher. When 
there is no other available, equally probative evidence on 
7 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948) 
(footnotes omitted). 
8 See, e.g., Duckworth v. State, 323 Md. 532, 594 A.2d 109 
(1991). 
9 Mo. RULE 5-404(b ). 
an important issue in dispute, the "other acts" evidence 
may be helpful, rather than confusing or distracting, to the 
fact-finder. 10 Nor will its admission under those 
circumstances unduly waste time. 
III. TRADITIONAL APPLICATION OF RULE 5-
404(b)AND THE COMMON LAW RULES THAT 
IT CODIFIED 
Rule 5-404(b) 's use of the phrase "such as" imports 
that the permissible purposes listed in the rule are merely 
examples of''well-established categories"11 of admissibility 
and are not exclusive. Any relevant purpose other than 
proving only "character of a person in order to show action 
in conformity therewith"12 is proper. The court of appeals 
has repeatedly referred to this principle as one that the 
proffered evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts must 
have "special relevance."13 
Under the court of appeals' 1989 decision in State 
v. Faulkner, 14 if "other acts" evidence has "special 
relevance," it may be admitted by the trial court and heard 
by the jury, if the judge is satisfied that there is "clear and 
convincing evidence" of the other acts and who performed 
10 E.g., Streaterv. State, 352 Md. 800,807, 724A.2d 111 (1999). 
11 Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 711-12, 415 A.2d 830, 839 
(1980) ("Some of the well-established categories of evidence 
outside the ambit of the narrow rule of exclusion include 
evidence of other crimes which tends to establish ( 1) motive, 
(2) intent, (3) absence of mistake, (4) a common scheme or plan 
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to 
each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, and 
( 5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of a 
crime on trial. Other exceptions have been recognized as 
well."), cert. denied,466 U.S. 993 (1984). 
12 Mo.RULE 5-404(b); see, e.g., Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307,311, 
718 A.2d 588, 590 (1998) ("In Maryland, it is a rule of exclusion 
that recognizes the general exclusion of other crimes evidence 
with a group of stated, but not exhaustive, exceptions."); State 
v. Faulkner, 314Md. 630,633-35, 552A.2d 896,897-98 (1989). 
13 E.g., Streater, 352 Md. at 808-09, 724A.2dat 114-15. 
14 314Md. at633-35, 552 A.2dat897-98. 
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them, and if the judge finds that the evidence has sufficient 
probative value that it should not be excluded by virtue of 
the considerations now codified in Rule 5-403. 
The case law interpreting Rule 5-404(b) and the 
common law rules that it codified traditionally has looked 
not only at the elements of the claim or charge being tried, 
but also at the defense presented, to determine on which 
issue or issues it may be fair and appropriate to provide 
the fact-finder with the "other acts" evidence. 
For example, assume that a defendant is charged 
with having fractured a child's skull. To make a prima 
facie case, the State offers evidence that the child was in 
the care of the defendant at the time the injury was suffered, 
as well as medical evidence regarding the injury and the 
type of force that could cause it. Under Rule 5-404(b) 
and the case law it codified, if the defendant or another 
defense witness testifies that the child's injuries resulted 
from the child's accidentally slipping in the bathtub and 
hitting his head, the trial judge will have the power to admit, 
to prove "absence of ... accident,"15 evidence that the 
defendant previously had custody of five other young 
children who received head fractures while in her care. 
The evidence of these other acts would have the requisite 
"special relevance" and would be helpful to the jury in 
determining whether the injury occurred as the defense 
portrays it. The Faulkner gloss on Rule 5-404(b) also 
requires, for admissibility, both that there be clear and 
convincing proo:f16 that the defendant caused the other 
fractures and, second, that the judge does not find that the 
evidence should be excluded for the reasons codified in 
Rule 5-403. 17 
This three-step Faulkner process is itself, then, rather 
complicated. But, over the past two years, a majority of 
the court of appeals has rendered four decisions that 
15 See Duckworth v. State, 323 Md. 532,544-45, 594A.2d 109, 
114-15(1991). 
16 E.g., Skrivanek v. State, 356 Md. 270,291-92,739 A.2d 12,24 
(1999). 
17 E.g., Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724,736-39,679 A.2d 1106, 
1112-14 (1996); Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602,634-36, 645A.2d 
22,37-38 (1994). 
31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 7 
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combine to further burden the trial judges and impede the 
efficient administration of justice. 
IV. WYNN AND STREATER FURTHER 
COMPLICATE THE TRIAL JUDGES'TASK 
In 1998 and 1999 the court of appeals announced 
two decisions that have unduly complicated the trial judges' 
job with regard to the application of Rule 5-404(b ): JiJYnn 
v. State 18 and Streater v. State. 19 
In JiJYnn, the majority reversed the trial court when 
it disagreed with the ground stated by the trial judge for 
admission of Rule 5-404(b) evidence. The majority 
refused to look at whether the admission of the evidence 
was proper under another label. Yet, ifthe admission was 
proper, no harm resulted. The court of appeals' approach 
in JiJYnn strays from the basic, "no harm, no foul" premise 
of appellate review. JiJYnn burdens the system with 
unnecessary, costly, time-consuming new trials. 
In Streater, the majority reversed the trial judge, even 
though it found that she had ruled correctly on the objection 
that had been made. Deviating from two well-established 
principles, first, that a trial judge need only rule on the 
objections raised by counsel at trial, and, second, that only 
those will be reviewed on appeal, the majority faulted the 
trial court for not proceeding to perform the three-step 
Faulkner-5-404(b) analysis sua sponte. 
The Streater majority also urged trial judges to 
conduct the Faulkner-5-404(b) analysis on the record. 
If this directive means that the appellate court will fmd the 
lack of such a record to be reversible error, even if the 
appellate court, in its own analysis ofRule 5-404(b ), would 
have reached the same result as did the trial court, 
reversible error again will be unnecessarily created. 
A. Wynn 
In Wynn, a majority of the court of appeals found 
evidence had special relevance to the accused's "absence 
of mistake," which is a permissible purpose for "other acts" 
evidence specifically stated in Rule 5-404(b ). The 
defendant was tried on ten counts of burglary, 
housebreaking, and theft, but the trials were severed into 
three. 
The third trial was for the fifth and sixth counts, the 
housebreaking and theft charges related to one dwelling 
(the Quigley home). In the State's case-in-chief at that 
trial, evidence was admitted as to the ninth and tenth counts, 
housebreaking of and theft from another residence (the 
Garrison home) in the same neighborhood on the same 
weekend. The State was making an anticipatory strike, 
with the expectation that the defendant would rely on the 
same defense he had employed in the preceding trials on 
the other counts. That defense was that he had bought 
from a flea market the items that were later found in his 
possession and matched the description of the stolen 
goods.20 
The defendant never took the stand at the third trial. 
But he offered a defense that, if believed, supported this 
alternative explanation for his possession of the Quigley 
goods. A defense witness testified that she saw the 
defendant at a flea market, carrying several bags of 
merchandise. Defense counsel in closing argued that the 
defendant had innocently purchased, at the flea market, 
the items that were found at his house.21 
The court of special appeals affmned the defendant's 
conviction, on the ground that, "[b ]ecause appellant argued 
a defense of mistake or accident evidence of prior similar 
acts was admissible to show lack of mistake or accident. "22 
The court of appeals reversed. 
The majority, in an opinion authored by Judge Cathell, 
stressed that the defendant had not yet presented a defense 
at the time the other crimes evidence was admitted,23 but 
that the trial court erroneously had concluded that proffered 2o Wynn, 351 Md. at 319 & n. 7, 718 A.2d at 594 & n. 7. 
18 351 Md.307, 718A.2d588(1998). 
19 352 Md. 800,724 A.2d Ill (1999). 
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21 /d. at 315, 718 A.2d at 592. 
22 Wynn v. State, 117 Md. App. 133, 150, 699 A.2d 512, 520 
(1997),rev'd,351 Md.307, 718A.2d588(1998). 
23 351 Md.at314&nn.2-3,333, 718A.2dat591-92&nn.2-3. 
it did not rest its finding of error on that basis. 24 It thus 
suggested that this was a risky undertaking on the part of 
the State, which was gambling that the accused would 
offer a defense of mistake or accident. The crux of the 
majority opinion is that the accused did not assert a defense 
that the majority felt fit into the Rule 5-404(b) pigeonhole 
of "absence of mistake." 
This decision is ill-considered for two reasons. First, 
the majority read the "absence of mistake" category too 
narrowly. Second, even ifthe majority disagreed with the 
trial court's reading of "absence of mistake;' the appellate 
court should have affirmed the trial court's ruling, ifthe 
appellate court found that the evidence would have been 
properly admitted under some other rubric. The majority 
declined to undertake that inquiry. 
1. The Evidence Should Have Been Held to Have 
Been Properly Admitted to Prove "Absence of 
Mistake" 
The rfjlnn majority limited the reach of the "absence 
of mistake" category to situations where the accused's 
defense was either that he had entered the Quigley house, 
but by mistake, or that he had stolen the Quigley property, 
but in the mistaken belief that he had a right to it.25 It 
stressed that the defendant was not charged with 
possession of stolen property, and reasoned that, therefore, 
his "mistake" in possessing those particular goods was 
not in issue.26 
But the majority overlooked the Maryland case law 
under which it is well established that, absent a reasonable 
explanation, the defendant's possession of recently stolen 
24 See id. at 334 n.l, 718 A.2d at 602 n.l ("Notwithstanding the 
majority's reference to the fact that the State introduced this 
evidence before the defense presented its case, that is clearly 
not the ratio decidendi of the majority opinion nor was it the 
basis of any objection below.") (Raker, J., dissenting). 
25 351 Md.at 332, 718 A.2d at 600. These are, of course, two 
situations where the "absence of mistake" category clearly 
would apply. 
26 Id.at331-32, 718A.2dat600. 
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goods will support a factual inference that he is the thief ''27 
Once the defendant puts forward a "reasonable" 
explanation of his innocent possession ofthe goods, as a 
practical matter he puts the ball back in the State's court 
to prove, with additional evidence, that his possession was 
not innocent. 
The Wynn majority mistakenly opined that, ifthe 
challenged "other acts" Garrison evidence were proper in 
rfjlnn, similar evidence would be admissible in "virtually 
any" theft case when the defendant "pleads not guilty."28 
This is not so. The evidence would not have been 
admissible in rfjlnn had the defendant merely put the State's 
proof to its test, or had he denied either that he had been 
at the Quigley home or that he had the goods in his 
possession. It was his argument that he had obtained the 
Quigley goods, but innocently, at a flea market, that gave 
the Garrison evidence "special relevance." 
In her strong dissent, Judge Raker argued that the 
trial judge had properly admitted the evidence to prove 
absence ofthe accused's mistakenly or accidentally having 
the stolen goods. 29 Her analysis focused on the "doctrine 
of chances" as proof oflack of accident or coincidence: 
[T]he doctrine of chances rests on the trial 
court's assessment of the improbability that 
someone would be innocently involved in similar 
activity .... The unlikely coincidence that Wynn 
purchased the items at a flea market triggered 
the court's appropriate, albeit unspecified, 
application of the doctrine of chances. 
Moreover, the clear and immediate limiting 
27 E.g., Simms v. State, 83 Md.App. 204,210-12, 574A.2d 12, 15-
17 (in a trial for daytime house breaking and misdemeanor theft 
of a credit card, no error in admitting evidence that defendant 
"used the credit card a mere five hours after breaking and 
entering was discovered and his flight upon being discovered 
[as it was] relevant to proving appellant's guilt without simply 
showing propensity."), cert. denied, 321 Md. 68, 580 A.2d 1077 
(1990). See Wynn v. State, 351 Md. at 340-43,718 A.2d at 604-
06 (Raker, J., dissenting). 
28 351 Md. at 333, 718 A.2d at 601. 
29 Id. at 355,718 A.2d at 612. 
31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 9 
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instruction given by the trial judge further 
supports the conclusion that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of 
Wynn's prior criminal acts.30 
Judge Raker had the better reasoned argument. 
2. The Majority's Approach Unnecessarily Creates 
Reversible Error Even When the Trial Court Has 
Ruled Correctly, but has Stated the Wrong Reason 
for Its Ruling 
Unfortunately, the majority refused to go on to 
consider whether the evidence was properly admitted, 
under Rule 5-404(b ), on any ground other than "absence 
of mistake or accident."31 This approach, which the 
majority ascribes to "the limitation of our certiorari 
jurisdiction" and to allowing the defense an opportunity to 
respond to each ground relied on, 32 "misses the forest for 
the trees." 
30 !d. at 355,718 A.2d at 612. See id. at 334-35,718 A.2d at 601-
02 ("Wynn's possession of the goods stolen from the Quigley 
home, explained throughout his trial defense as the result of an 
innocent and unknowing purchase, might otherwise be 
characterized as 'unintentional,' 'mistaken' or even 
'accidental.' It was for the purpose of dispelling Wynn's 
express claim, and its various possible characterizations, that 
the trial court rightfully permitted the prosecution to present 
evidence of Wynn's possession of goods stolen from the other 
residences. His possession was no mistake or accident"). 
(Raker, J., dissenting). 
31 !d. at 318 n.6, 718 A.2d at 593 n.6 (The court's footnote 
argues that relevance for another non-character purpose, other 
than absence of mistake, is of no consequence: "As we 
understand it, if' other crimes' evidence is offered under the 
absence of mistake exception and is found to be inadmissible, 
the matter is over; a probative value assessment is not made"). 
32 !d. at 324-25 & n.8, 712 A.2d at 596-97 & n.8 ("[T]he State did 
not, in any forum, present the 'doctrine of chances' relied upon 
extensively in the dissent. We considered the petition, the 
State's limited response, and granted the writ as presented. In 
the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction, we do not perceive 
any extraordinary facet of this case that leads us to consider an 
issue not properly presented. *** It would be, in our view, 
equally unfair for this Court to do as the dissent suggests, i.e., 
31.1 U. Bait L.F. 10 
The logic of the trial court's ruling was clear to the 
defense at trial. The defense had ample opportunity to 
refute that logic at trial. The court of appeals' requirement 
of what it perceives to be the correct "labeling" under Rule 
5-404(b) places a formalistic and unduly heavy burden 
on the trial judge, and reaps no concomitant benefit in 
fairness or justice. 
More importantly, under the common sense 
approach of"no harm, no foul,"33 the routine handling of 
evidentiary rulings is that the trial judge will be affirmed, if 
he or she reached an appropriate ruling as to admission or 
exclusion, even ifthe judge gave an incorrect reason for 
that ruling. 34 To require trial judges not only to reach the 
right decisions but also to state the correct reasons for 
each of the multitude of evidentiary rulings they make--
and to reverse their correct decisions, if they do not-- is 
to exalt "form over substance."35 
The Tf)lnn court's approach of refusing to perform 
the analysis as to whether the trial judge was "right for the 
wrong reason" will result in requiring a new trial when no 
unfairness resulted from the "incorrect" grounds having 
been given at the first trial, for a ruling which, as to the 
bottom line, was correct. This would be an extravagant 
use of judicial resources under any circumstances. But to 
impose this unnecessary cost of time and judicial resources, 
rely on a Faulkner first-prong exception never presented below 
and then balance its probative [value] with its prejudicial effect, 
without affording any opportunity to the defendant to be heard 
on that specific exception.") (footnotes omitted). 
33 See Mo. RuLE 5-1 03(a) ("Error may not be predicated upon a 
ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless the party is 
prejudiced by the ruling .... "). 
34 E.g., Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502,403 A.2d 1221, 1223 
(1979) ("[W]here the record in a case adequately demonstrates 
that the decision of the trial court was correct, although on a 
ground not relied upon by the trial court and perhaps not even 
raised by the parties, an appellate court will affirm. In other 
words, a trial court's decision may be correct although for a 
different reason than relied on by that court"), cert. denied, 444 
U.S.1021 (1980). 
35 Wynn, 351 Md. at 354, 718 A.2d at 611 (Raker, J., dissenting). 
when our courts are already fighting heavy backlogs, is 
especially irresponsible. 
B. Streater 
This undesirable result has been compounded by the 
court of appeals' decision in Streater. Streater again 
employs too fme-toothed a comb when reviewing a trial 
judge's ruling on an objection. 
1. Streater Reversed a Trial Court When It Had 
Ruled Properly on the Objection Made 
In Streater, a majority of the court of appeals, in an 
opinion by Judge Chasanow, reversed a trial court's 
decision to admit other crimes evidence contained within 
a protective order, even though the defense had objected 
only to the admission of evidence of the existence of the 
protective order, which fact the court of appeals held was 
admitted properly. 36 The majority held that the trial judge 
was required to have performed the three-step Faulkner 
"other acts" analysis on the record, even though no 
objection had been made under Rule 5-404(b) and, indeed, 
a different objection had been made. This decision places 
an unprecedented onus on the trial court. 
Streater was tried for stalking his estranged wife. His 
lawyer objected to the admission of evidence that the victim 
had obtained a protective order, which required the 
defendant to stay away from her. The majority of the 
court of appeals held that that fact was properly admitted, 
as relevant both to the defendant's course of conduct and 
to his having been warned to stay away.37 This holding 
was correct, and the appellate court's role should have 
ended there. 
But the majority's intimate knowledge of and 
exuberance for the intricacies of Rule 5-404(b) took it 
too far. It held that the trial court committed reversible 
error in admitting the entire protective order without sua 
sponte conducting an inquiry as to the admissibility of other 
36 352 Md. 800, 724 A.2d Ill (1999). 
37 Jd. at 805, 812-13, 724 A.2d at 113,117. 
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crimes evidence -- including a break -in of and theft from 
the wife's home-- related in the order.38 This part of the 
decision is contnny to two well-established principles under 
Maryland case law. First, a party must object to particular 
evidence at trial in order to preserve for appeal the question 
of its admission.39 Second, if a party's objection is 
specific, the party is restricted to making only that same 
argument on appeal. 40 Streater holds trial judges to an 
unprecedented standard. 
2. Streater Directs Trial Judges to Conduct Their 
F aulkner-5-404(b) Analysis on the Record 
The Streater majority further burdened trial judges 
by directing them to conduct their three-step Faulkner-
5-404(b) analysis, regarding (1) "special relevance," (2) 
clear and convincing proof, and (3) a balancing of 
probative value versus unfair prejudice, on the record in 
order to enhance appellate review. Repeated comments 
to this effect are sprinkled throughout the majority's 
opinion.41 This instruction undermines the approach 
38 !d. at 812-23, 724 A.2d at 117-122. 
39 MD. RuLEs2-517, 3-517,4-323, and5-103. See, e.g., 
Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 539-45, 735 A.2d 1061, 1066-
70(1999). 
40 E.g., Klauenberg, 355 Md. at 541-42,735 A.2d at 1068. 
41 See Streater, 352 Md. at 810, 724 A.2d at 116 ("[S]hould the 
trial court allow the admission of other crimes evidence, it 
should state its reasons for doing so in the record so as to 
enable a reviewing court to assess whether Md. Rule 5-404(b ), 
as interpreted through the case law, has been applied 
correctly"); id. at 812, 724 A.2d at 116 ("Nothing in the record 
shows that the trial court carefully assessed the admissibility of 
the factual findings of other crimes contained within the 
protective order"); id. at 819, 724 A.2d at120 ("Because of the 
sparse record, we find it difficult to opine on the probative 
value and potential prejudice of the 'battery or assault and 
battery' finding"); id. at 821 n.IO, 724A.2d at 121 n.lO ("We 
agree with the dissent that, in weighing the probative value and 
prejudicial effect of other crimes evidence, trial judges "are 
not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of 
logic' in weighing the competing considerations." In the 
instant case, the trial judge did not spell out any reasoning, and 
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followed by the drafters oiTitle 5, who deliberately declined 
to include such a directive in Rule 5-403, for example, for 
fear of unnecessarily creating reversible error for failure 
simply to state reasoning on the record.42 
3. A Strong Dissent 
Again, Judge Raker authored a strong, well-
reasoned dissent, in which she was joined by Judges 
Rodowsky and Cathell. The dissent found first that the 
evidence would have been properly admitted, even if a 
proper objection had been made. But it also properly 
stressed that the majority's opinion, requiring a ruling absent 
a proper objection, deviates from pre-Maryland law: "The 
effect ofthe majority opinion is that absent any objection 
to the factual fmdings contained within the protective order, 
or articulated basis for exclusion, the trial court must 
nonetheless apply the three-pronged test of Faulkner, an 
approach simply inconsistent with established Maryland 
law."43 
neither is there any indication that he in fact conducted a 
weighing of the probative value and prejudice of the other 
crimes evidence.") (emphasis in original; citations omitted); id. 
at 822, 724 A.2d at 121-22 ("[l]n the instant case the record 
reveals no determinations as to the relevancy, the sufficiency 
of evidence that the other crimes occurred, or the probative 
value and potential prejudice of admitting the evidence"). See 
also Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 566, 735 A.2d 1061, 1081 
(1999) ("Because the evidence constituted 'bad acts' evidence 
under the circumstances of this case, and was objected to by 
Klauenberg, the trial court should have engaged in an on-the-
record Faulkner analysis to determine whether the evidence 
had special relevance, whether there was clear and convincing 
evidence that the acts occurred, and whether the probative 
value of the evidence outweighed the unfair prejudice") (Raker, 
J., dissenting, joined by Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J.) (citing 
Streater). 
42 Court of Appeals of Maryland's Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes of Oct. 16, 1992 
meeting, at 41. 
43 352 Md. at 823,827, 724A.2dat 122-24 (Raker, J., dissenting, 
joined by Rodowsky and Cathell, JJ.). 
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Finally, as the dissent points out, a requirement that 
the F aulkner-5-404(b) analysis be on the record disserves 
the justice system: 
The Majority reverses the judgment of the circuit 
court because the trial court failed to engage in the 
Faulkner analysis on the record. This result is unfair 
to trial judges and the public as well. 
... While it would certainly be better if the trial court 
spread the reasons for the ruling on the record, neither 
the Maryland Rules nor the case law require the trial 
court to do so. The Majority's position is a marked 
change in Maryland law.44 
C. Effect of Ujmn and Streater 
Tt)lnn and Streater both unnecessarily increase the 
burden on the trial judges ruling on the admission of "other 
acts" evidence under Rule 5-404(b ). Trial judges must 
dot their "i 's" and cross their ''t's" perfectly, even if objection 
on a ground other than Faulkner-5-404(b) is made. Yet 
two subsequent decisions of the court of appeals itself, in 
Klauenberg and Sessoms, exhibit confusion regarding 
such evidence. These decisions are likely to compound 
the consternation that trial judges might well be enjoying. 
V. KLAUENBERG AND SESSOMS MISREAD 
RULE 5-404(b) 
InKlauenbergv. State,45 the majority of the court 
of appeals with one hand set forth a helpful clarification of 
the breadth of Rule 5-404(b )'s phrase "other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts," as including both "good" and "bad acts." 
But then, with the other hand, it obfuscated matters by 
narrowing its discussion of the scope ofRule 5 -404(b) to 
"bad acts." Additionally, although the majority correctly 
defined "bad acts" (a definition that could be helpful on an 
issue of whether an error was reversible or harmless, as 
44 !d. at 827-28,724 A.2d at 124-25 (citations omitted). 
45 355 Md. 528,735 A.2d 1061 (1999). 
opposed to whether Rule 5-404(b) is applicable) it 
misapplied that definition. 
In Sessoms v. State, 46 the court of appeals 
contradicted the text of Rule 5-404(b) and confounded 
"other acts" jurisprudence by holding that the Rule does 
not apply at all, in criminal cases, with regard to "other 
acts" of anyone except the accused. This decision undoes 
the careful structure and public policy resolutions ofRule 
5-404(b) and leaves the trial judges equipped only with 
Rule 5-403 when ruling, in criminal cases, on the 
admissibility of" other acts" evidence of persons other than 
the accused. In reaching this decision, the Sessoms 
majority relied on Maryland cases that had not raised the 
issue before the Sessoms court and misjudged the weight 
of the federal case law on the question. 
A. Klauenberg 
Klauenberg was tried and convicted for soliciting the 
murder of court of special appeals Chief Judge Joseph 
Murphy, who had presided, in the circuit court, over a 
dispute between the defendant and his sister regarding their 
father's estate. Evidence was admitted at trial that the 
defendant had offered another person money to murder 
Chief Judge Murphy. 
Evidence of some ofKlauenberg's "other acts" was 
admitted: testimony was given regarding the defendant's 
threats and menacing behavior to others involved in the 
civil lawsuit (his sister, her attorney, and a special auditor), 
as well as of his possession of guns and ammunition. 
Klauenberg's conviction was not reversed. 
1. If the Other Acts Do Not Need to be "Bad" to 
Fall Within Rule 5-404(b ), Why Does the Court Allow 
Itself to Be Taken There? 
The majority opinion of the court of appeals, authored 
by Judge Cathell, began its Rule 5-404(b) discussion with 
promise. It helpfully and correctly explained that Rule 5-
404(b) concerns "other acts," which may be either "good" 
or "bad" and either prior or subsequent to the act at issue 
46 357 Md. 274,744 A.2d 9 (2000). 
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at trial. 47 Nonetheless, for the stated reason that the 
defendant's pretrial motion in limine and his trial objections 
had been to exclude "bad acts" evidence, the majority 
was seduced to define "bad acts" (a category to which, it 
had just explained, Rule 5 -404(b) is not restricted). 
The majority's definition was as follows: "[A] bad 
act is an activity or conduct, not necessarily criminal, that 
tends to impugn or reflect adversely upon one's character, 
taking into consideration the facts of the underlying lawsuit. 
It is from this general proposition that we evaluate whether 
the evidence to which appellant protests as erroneously 
admitted were bad acts under Maryland Rule 5-404(b )."48 
The majority then evaluated the matters as to which the 
Rule 5-404(b) issue was preserved for appeal49 and, having 
found that they did not qualify as "bad acts," concluded 
that they thus did not fall within Rule 5-404(b ). 
The first flaw in the majority's analysis was its focusing 
solely on whether the evidence objected to was of"bad 
acts" and not, as Rule 5-404(b) states (and as the majority 
itselfhad explained), of "other acts." If evidence of "other 
acts" is erroneously admitted, whether those acts were 
"bad" will be relevant only to whether prejudice is likely 
to have resulted or if the error is harmless. Klauenberg's 
emphasis on whether acts are "bad," and its apparent 
holding that Rule 5-404(b) is inapplicable because the acts 
were not "bad," is misleading. 
Whether admitted evidence is of "other acts"-- not 
necessarily "bad acts"-- is the key to whether Rule 5-
404(b) comes into play. For example, circumstantial 
evidence that is relevant to placing a defendant at the scene 
of the crime, or as having an instrumentality or fruit of the 
crime, is admissible to prove the defendant's commission 
of the charged crime, even though it coincidentally proves 
47 355 Md. at 547 n.3, 735 A.2d at 1071 n.3. 
48 Jd. at549, 735 A.2dat 1072. 
49 A number of objections were waived. I d. at 539-46, 551-55, 
735A.2dat 1066-71,1072-75. 
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the defendant's commission of another crime. 50 It is, under 
these circwnstances, not considered to be evidence of acts 
"other'' than the one charged. 
2. Having Been Taken Down a Wrong Turn, The 
Majority Struggles to Find the Other Acts Not to Be 
"Bad" 
Having incorrectly followed the defendant's lead and 
set up the inquiry, as to the scope ofRule 5-404(b ), to be 
whether the defendant's "other acts" were "bad," the 
majority then evaluated the objected-to evidence to 
determine whether it was evidence of "bad acts." The 
majority first reached the noncontroversial conclusion that 
the defendant's mere involvement in a civil lawsuit was 
not evidence of a "bad act."51 But then it stretched. 
It asserted that the sister's lawyer's testimony that 
the defendant had become ''verbally confrontational and 
poked [the sister's lawyer] in the chest .... is not conduct 
that tends to impugn [the defendant's] character."52 It found 
that the lawyer's testimony that, during a police search of 
the defendant's house,"' [t]here was one place [defendant] 
stood without moving while people went into other rooms 
in the basement, and fortunately the police were literally 
right next to him surrounding him as he went through this 
exercise, "'53 and the lawyer "later discovered that there 
was a gun stored in the ceiling tiles above the area in which 
appellant stood still,"54 was not evidence of"bad acts": 
50 See, e.g., Solomon v. State, 101 Md.App. 331,370-74,376-78, 
646A.2d 1064, 1083-85, 1086 (1994); Stancil v. State, 78 
Md.App. 376,381-84,553 A.2d268, 270-72 (evidence that 
defendant, charged with kidnapping a baby, subsequently 
applied for food stamps and falsely claimed that she was the 
mother of the baby with her, was relevant to show that she 
possessed a fruit of the crime and thus to show her identity as 
the kidnapper), cert. denied, 315 Md. 692, 556 A.2d 674 (1989). 
51 Klauenberg at 550,735 A.2d at 1072-73. 
52 !d. at 551,735 A.2d at 1073. 
53 /d. at 550, 735 A.2d at 1073. 
54 !d. 
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To be sure, the fact that the police stood near 
appellant while he was acting peculiarly imparts 
a general impression that they feared appellant 
might act out. But there is no indication that he 
did. Standing in place without moving, which is 
the supposed bad act appellant argues should 
not have been disclosed to the jury, does not 
impugn his character. Standing and watching 
while one's house is being searched is probably 
a common reaction. Therefore, because this 
conduct to which [the lawyer] testified is not a 
bad act, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting it. 
Similarly, [the lawyer's] testimony that two guns 
and ammunition were found on appellant's 
premises, without more, does not constitute a 
bad act.. .. There was no indication that these 
firearms were obtained or possessed illegally. 
No evidence was offered at trial that appellant's 
guns were to be used in the murder. Therefore, 
under the circumstances of this case, the 
evidence of appellant's conduct toward [the 
lawyer] and the evidence of the guns were not 
bad acts. 55 
The majority's reasoning here was unpersuasive. 
Certainly, the defendant's acts, in the context of the case, 
would not be perceived as innocent by most jurors. His 
possession of guns and ammunition, coupled with his anger 
and his threatening behavior toward a participant in the 
civil suit, would make him seem dangerous. 
For this reason, it was not surprising that Judge Raker, 
joined by Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge, again filed 
a strong dissent; they would have found reversible error 
under Rule 5-404(b) in the admission of this evidence, as 
well as in the admission of other evidence during the guilt/ 
innocence phase of the trial, tending to show the 
defendant's "bizarre" behavior, when the trial court had 
bifurcated for a later trial the issue of lack of criminal 
55 Jd. at 550-51, 735 A.2d at 1073. 
responsibility. 56 
3. A Better Route to Affirmance 
In order to affirm Klauenberg 's conviction, the 
majority did not need to find that the objected-to evidence 
was not within the ambit of Rule 5-404(b ). The 
defendant's involvement in the civil lawsuit was not a ''bad 
act", but it was an "other act," so the court of appeals 
should have applied Rule 5-404(b ). The civil lawsuit was 
properly admissible under Rule 5-404(b ), because it had 
"special relevance" to the defendant's motive to have Judge 
Murphy murdered. Proving "motive" is one of the 
permissible purposes specifically listed in Rule 5-404(b) 
for "other acts" evidence. This was, correctly, the basis 
of Judge Hubbard's ruling at triat57 
Moreover, Klauenberg's defense apparently was 
lack of intent. 58 The menacing conduct toward the sister's 
lawyer was an "other act," so that Rule 5-404(b) applied. 
But it was "specially relevant" to prove the defendant's 
anger toward his perceived adversaries in the lawsuit and 
thus admissible, under Rule 5-404(b ), to show his intent 
to commit the charged crime. The majority should have 
aflmned the trial court's ruling on that basis. 
Because Klauenberg 's ability to personally commit 
the murder was not at issue, the most problematic piece 
of" other acts" evidence, with the greatest potential for 
causing unfair prejudice, was the description of the guns 
and ammunition at his house. It is unclear whether he may 
have planned to provide a weapon to the man he asked to 
murder Chief Judge Murphy. But, given the fact that 
"[b ]oth the State and the defense talked to the jury about 
whether Klauenberg had the means to commit the 
offense," even the dissent concluded that,"[ u ]nder these 
circumstances, Klauenberg's possession of guns and 
ammunition might well have been highly relevant to the 
56 !d. at 559-60,563 n.5, 735 A.2d at 1077-78, 1079 n. 5 (Raker, J., 
dissenting, joined by Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J.). 
57 !d. at 563,735 A.2d at 1079 (Raker, J., dissenting, joined by 
Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J.). 
58 !d. at 560 & n.2, 735 A.2d at 1078. 
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proceedings."59 Having the means was not only on its 
own a purpose other than merely proving character, it was 
also relevant to intent to have the murder committed, and 
thus its admission under Rule 5-404(b) was not an abuse 
of discretion. 
4. Effect 
The majority opinion in Klauenberg properly 
articulates, but then clouds, the fact that Rule 5-404(b) 
addresses "other acts," not only "bad acts." It also 
provides a strained interpretation of what types of acts 
are not "bad," rather than simply holding that the "other 
acts" evidence was properly admitted to prove motive 
and intent. For both of these reasons, the opinion may 
mislead trial courts in future cases. 
B. Sessoms 
The court of appeals' decision in Sessoms 
misconstrues Rule 5-404(b ). Unlike Rule 5-404(a)(l )(A) 
and (B), which refer specifically to "the accused" and "the 
prosecution,"60 Rule 5-404(b) speaks broadly of "a 
59 !d. at 560-61,735 A.2d at 1078. 
60 Mo. RuLE 5-404(a)(l) provides: 
(1) In General. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait or character is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(A) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character of an accused offered by the accused, or by 
the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(B) CharacterofVictim. Evidence of a pertinent trait 
of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused or 
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a 
character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(C) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of 
a witness with regard to credibility, as provided in Rules 5-607, 
5-608, and 5-609. (Emphasis added.) 
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person."61 Yet, in Sessoms, the court of appeals made 
the stunning announcement that, in criminal cases, Rule 5-
404(b) applies only to "other acts" ofthe "accused." The 
Sessoms majority removes the Rule's carefully structured 
analysis from a criminal case in which evidence of other 
acts by anyone else is offered. Taking away the application 
of the propensity rule removes one of the central supports 
of our justice system, essential to keeping trials focused 
on the case at issue. 
In Sessoms, this liberalization of the rules of evidence 
was accomplished with regard to a person neither defendant 
nor victim, whose other acts were not central to what 
happened between the defendant and the victim. The 
Sessoms majority found that the exclusion under Rule 5-
404(b) of evidence of allegations of other crimes by the 
alleged rape victim's brother was reversible error. 
Sessoms leaves criminal trial courts with only Rule 
5-403 to assess the admissibility of evidence of"other 
acts" by persons other than the accused. The three 
dissenting judges, Judge Wilner, joined by Judges 
Rodowsky and Raker, would have aiirrmed the trial court's 
ruling as a proper exercise of discretion under Rule 5-
403. 
The court of appeals could better achieve the purpose 
it had in mind by leaving Rule 5-404(b) intact in its 
application to acts of all persons and tweaking instead 
that part of the Faulkner gloss that requires "clear and 
convincing evidence" ofthe other acts. 
1. Facts and Holding 
Sessoms, a man, was charged with raping a woman. 
The defendant was convicted only of a third-degree sexual 
offense. 62 The court of appeals reversed. 
The victim testified that the defendant, who was a 
stranger to her, dragged her into an alley and raped her 
twice at knife point. 63 She testified that she ran away and 
61 Mo. RULE 5-404(b ), supra at text accompanying note 4. 
62 Sessoms v. State, 357 Md.274, 281, 744A.2d 9, 13 (2000). 
63 !d. at 277, 744 A.2d at 11. 
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told her brother, and that her brother and a friend 
subsequently severely beat the defendant.64 
Medical testimony and other circumstantial evidence, 
some of which was testified to by the victim's brother, 
supported the victim's testimony of rape and of its having 
occurred in the alley. 65 The brother's character for 
truthfulness was impeached by his prior convictions for 
robbery, including a robbery the day after the alleged 
rape.66 
The defendant testified that he was beaten 
unconscious by two men, one of whom claimed that the 
defendant had robbed the man's sister. 67 When he regained 
consciousness in the hospital, he noticed that money and 
lottery tickets were missing from his pockets. 68 
The trial court permitted the defense to question the 
victim to establish that, when a police officer drove her 
home from the hospital where she had been examined and 
treated, she initially identified a man on the street as her 
brother, but a moment later said, "'I ain't saying it is my 
brother or isn't my brother. "'69 The trial court refused to 
allow the defense to show that, in the time intervening 
between those statements, a third man (notthe defendant) 
ran up to the police car and said that he had just been 
robbed by the person whom the victim had identified as 
her brother. 70 
The court of appeals held, first, that Rule 5-404(b) 
and the three-step Faulkner analysis under it simply do 
"not apply [in criminal cases] to crimes, wrongs, or acts 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at 277-78, 744 A.2d at 11 (majority opinion); id. at 
296-97, 744A.2d at 21 (Wilner, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rodowsky and Raker, JJ. ). 
66 !d. at 302-03, 744 A.2d 24-25 (Wilner, J., dissenting, joined by 
Rodowsky and Raker, JJ.). 
67 !d. at 278, 744 A.2d at 12. 
68 !d. at 279, 744 A.2d at 12. 
69 !d. 
70 !d. at 279-80, 744 A.2d at 12. 
committed by anyone other than the defendant."71 It then 
held that the trial court had committed reversible error in 
excluding the evidence of the allegation of another robbery 
by the victim's brother, as it was relevant to bias on the 
part of both the victim and the brother and should have 
been admitted under Rule 5-616(b)(3). The court of 
appeals was wrong on both counts. 
A better course, which would achieve appropriate 
protection ofthe accused, would be to recognize that Rule 
5-404(b) applies, but either to hold that the part of the 
Faulkner gloss that requires "clear and convincing 
evidence" of the other acts is applicable only to other acts 
of the accused, or to overrule Faulkner as to that higher 
standard altogether. 
2. The Court of Appeals Incorrectly Held that Rule 
5-404(b) is Inapplicable to Acts of Persons Other 
Than the Accused 
Judge Cathell, writing for the Sessoms majority, 
stated: 
We hold that the test for admitting other crimes 
evidence in criminal proceedings enunciated in 
Faulkner generally does not apply to crimes, 
wrongs, or acts committed by someone other 
than a criminal defendant....Because this rule is 
premised upon protecting an accused from 
undue prejudice, it does not apply to exclude 
other crimes evidence involving alleged actions 
by others testifying in the criminal proceedings. 72 
Such evidence will be subject to exclusion pursuant only 
to Rule 5-403. 
The removal of Rule 5-404(b) 's strictures tips the 
scales in favor of admission of"other acts" evidence in 
criminal cases with regard to acts of persons other than 
the accused, in two respects. First, Rule 5-403, unlike 
Rule 5-404(b ), is a rule favoring admission, unless the 
11 !d. at281, 744 A.2dat 13. 
72 /d. at294, 744A.2dat20. 
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probative value is "substantially outweighed" by one or 
more of the countervailing considerations. Second, the 
application of only Rule 5-403 removes the requirement 
that there be "clear and convincing"73 proof ofthe other 
acts. 
a. The Majority Misread Rule 5-404(b) and Prior 
Maryland Case Law 
Traditional rules of statutory construction dictate that 
the phrase "a person" in Federal Rule ofEvidence ("FRE") 
404(b) and Maryland Rule 5-404(b) be read to mean "a 
person"74 --not, as Sessoms in effect has held, "a person 
in civil cases, but in criminal cases, only the accused." 
The Sessoms majority cited Maryland cases applying 
the Rule 5-404(b) "propensity" rule to the accused, and 
the rationale therefor, stressing the risk of unfair conviction 
of the accused because of the admission of other acts 
evidence.75 It jumped to the conclusion that, therefore, it 
had "consistently held that, in a criminal proceeding, [Rule 
5-404(b ), and its Faulkner analysis] is a standard limited 
to acts committed by a defendant."76 This is an 
overstatement of the prior Maryland case law. 
None of the Maryland cases cited for this proposition 
in Sessoms involved facts where "other acts" evidence 
73 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
74 See United States v. McCourt, 925 F.2dl229, 1232 (9th Cir. 
1991 ). ("Fed.R.Evid. 404( a) provides that evidence of"a 
person s" character is not admissible for the purpose of proving 
action in conformity therewith except for pertinent character 
traits of an 'accused,' F ed.R.E vi d. 404( a )(1 ), a 'victim,' 
Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)(2), or a 'witness,' Fed.R.Evid. 404(a)(3), 607, 
608, 609. It therefore appears that Congress knew how to 
delineate subsets of 'persons' when it wanted to, and that it 
intended 'a person' and 'an accused' to have different 
meanings when the Rules speak of one rather than the other. 
Because Rule 404(b) plainly proscribes other crimes evidence 
of 'a person,' it cannot reasonably be construed as extending 
only to 'an accused"') (emphasis in original). 
75 I d. at 283-84, 744 A.2d at 14-15. 
76 I d. at 283, 744 A.2d at 14. 
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had been offered as to anyone other than the accused. 77 
The issue never having arisen, it is misleading to state that 
the court of appeals thus had held that the "other acts" 
rule is limited to acts committed by only the accused. 
In addition, the Sessoms court overlooked the fact 
that risk of an unfair conviction is not the lone rationale for 
Rule 5-404(b ). If it were, Rule 5-404(b) would be 
restricted, as is Rule 5-404(a)(l ), to "the accused" only. 
Rule 5-404(b) instead refers to "a person" and is applicable 
in both civil and criminal cases. Its rationale is comprised 
of all the considerations summarized generally in Rule 5-
403: a balancing of the relevance, i.e., the strength of the 
"probative value" of the evidence, against (1) the risk of 
"unfair prejudice" to any party (as well as the risk of 
unnecessary humiliation and embarrassment of a non-party 
witness, which concern is directly recognized in Rules 5-
412 and 5-611(a)); (2) the "distraction" ofthe jury from 
the most important issues in the case; and (3) the injudicious 
use of precious court "time." Particularly in criminal cases, 
where discovery is narrower than in civil cases, the risk of 
surprise is also a factor. 
All these concerns apply in a criminal case with regard 
to evidence of "other acts" of persons other than the 
accused. It is easy to foresee, for example, a defendant's 
argument that someone other than she committed the 
charged crime. The defendant then might offer "other acts" 
evidence of that third person to show that he committed 
this one. This possibility raises all the concerns of possible 
unfair prejudice to the State, confusion, and waste of time, 
which the drafters of the rules resolved by the combination 
77 The facts concerned other acts of only the accused in the 
following cases cited in Sessoms, id. at 283-84, 744 A.2d at 14-
15; Wynn v. State, 351 Md. 307,316-317, 718A.2d588, 592-593 
(1998); State v. Taylor, 347 Md. 363,368-369,701 A.2d389, 392 
(1997); Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 560, 693 A.2d 781, 798 
(1997);Ayers v. State, 335 Md. 602,630,645 A.2d22, 35 (1994); 
State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 633, 552 A.2d 869, 897 (1988); 
Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329,333, 465A.2d 1166, 1168 (1983); 
State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232,238, 395A.2d 1182, 1185 (1979); 
Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468,473, 386A.2d 757,761 (1978); 
McKnightv. State, 280 Md. 604,612,375 A.2d 551,556 (1977); 
and Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664,669, 350A.2d 680,684 (1976). 
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ofRule 5-404(b) (which codifies Faulkner's requirement 
of "special relevance") and Rule 5-403 (in its role to 
possibly exclude weak evidence that passes muster under 
Rule 5-404(b)).78 
b. Federal Authority and Case Law of Other States 
is Less Supportive of Sessoms than the Court 
Indicates 
The Sessoms majority overstates its support when it 
cites twelve federal cases and five cases from states outside 
Maryland as having adopted the interpretation ofFRE 
404(b) and its state corollaries (like Maryland Rule 5-
404(b)) that the majority espouses: that in a criminal case, 
Rule 404(b) applies only to evidence of the accused's other 
acts. 79 It asserts that "[ o ]nly the Ninth Circuit has 
expressed the minority view," i.e., that FRE 404(b) applies 
not only to acts by the accused but also to "acts committed 
by witnesses."80 In a footnote, the Sessoms majority itself 
points out, however, that the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit "later questioned its own 
reasoning" in having held as Sessoms does. 81 
Indeed, a number of the non-Maryland cases cited 
by the Sessoms majority in support of its decision are not 
on point. Three, from the United States Courts of Appeals 
for the First and Eighth Circuits, concern other issues 
altogether, such as who has standing to object under FRE 
404(b ). 82 Several others, decided by the Second, Fifth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, did not involve FRE 404(b) "other 
acts" at all, but acts by co-conspirators that were part of 
78 See infra notes 91-113 and accompanying text. 
79 /d.at287-91, 744A.2dat 16-19. 
80 !d. at 290 n.5, 744 A.2d at 18. 
81 !d. at 289 n.5, 744 A.2d at 18. 
82 Ofthose cases, United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 736 (1st 
Cir. 1991)(cited in Sessoms, 357 Md. at288, 744A.2dat18) 
addressed only the issue of standing to object. 
David, 940 F.2d at 737, cites United States v. Gonzalez-
Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572 (lstCir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 989 (1987) 
(cited in Sessoms, 357 Md. at 289,744 A.2dat 18). In Gonzalez-
the charged crime or conspiracy at issue at trial. 83 
Nor do the cases the Sessoms court cited that did 
concern "other acts" by third parties provide the 
ovetwhelming support that its opinion suggests. Several 
of the cited cases from two circuits (the Fifth and Eleventh) 
and three states (Colorado, Massachusetts, and New 
Jersey) unthinkingly rely on dictum in one Fifth Circuit case, 
in which evidence of a third person's acts was admitted in 
the government's case against the accused. And other 
cases from six federal circuits (the Second, Third, Fifth, 
Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh) and three states (Michigan, 
Nebraska, and Ohio) support the view characterized in 
Sessoms as the "minority" view. 
(1) Evidence of Others' Acts Admitted Against the 
Accused 
In three federal cases cited by the Sessoms majority, 
the evidence of others' "other acts" was admitted against 
Sanchez, FRE 404(b) was inapplicable, because the evidence in 
question was not offered to prove anyone's propensity to 
commit crime. 825 F.2d at at 582-83. The part ofthe case 
quoted by the Sessoms Court is dictum, citing Morano (see 
infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text). The Gonzalez-
Sanchez court also found as an alternative that, even ifFRE 
404(b) applied, the evidence was properly admitted; but, if error, 
it was harmless error. /d. at 583. 
In United States v. Kelley, 545 F.2d 619, 622-23 (8th Cir. 
1976),cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977)(citedinSessoms, 357 
Md. at 290, 744 A.2d at 18), the defendants, who were union 
officials charged with acts of violence towards the victims, had 
wished to cross-examine the victims about their having 
threatened the defendants and having been violent towards 
them on other occasions. But, as there was no claim of self-
defense, this evidence was held to be irrelevant as substantive 
evidence. FRE 404(b) therefore was inapplicable. The court of 
appeals also held that the trial court had not clearly abused its 
discretion in finding the evidence irrelevant to the witness's 
propensity for truthfulness. 545 F.2d at 623. 
83 United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1360-61 (11th Cir.l989); United 
States v. Sepulveda, 710 F.2d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Bates, 600 F.2d 505, 509 (5th Cir. 1979) (cited in 
Sessoms, 357 Md. at 289-90, 744 A.2d at 18). 
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the accused. The first, decided in the Fifth Circuit, 
stated in dictum that FRE 404(b) might not apply; the 
second and third, decided in the Eleventh Circuit, relied 
on that dictum. 
In United States v. Krezdorn, 84 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found no error in 
the admission, against the accused, of evidence of a third 
person's acts, saying that, "[a ]rguably,"85 Rule 404(b) did 
not apply. The court went on to hold that, even if Rule 
404(b) applied, the evidence was properly admitted as 
proof of a "common scheme" between that third person 
and the accused, regarding the charged crimes themselves. 
Therefore, its decision did not rest on the "arguable" 
inapplicability of FRE 404(b ). 
Yet this dictum bred a number of progeny, including 
two cases decided per curiam by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 1983 (which in 1990 
questioned its own reasoning in the case86). In United 
States v. Edwards, 87 the court of appeals correctly held 
that the "other acts" evidence, a co-conspirator's 
statements regarding the illegal drug business, was properly 
admissible as to the "knowledge" of that co-conspirator, 
which is a permissible purpose listed explicitly in FRE 
404(b ). It also went on to state, however, that the evidence 
in any event would not be subject to FRE 404(b ), and 
84 639 F.2d 1327, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1981). Additionally, the court 
of appeals did not find reversible error in the admission of other 
acts evidence regarding the accused, even though the 
appellate court found it not to have special relevance. /d. at 
1331-32. 
85 /d. at 1332. See id. at 1333 ("We need not decide, however, 
whether Rule 404(b) applies to this situation since the evidence 
of monetary payments is admissible whether or not Rule 404(b) 
applies"). 
86 United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 604-05 & n.11 (11th Cir. 
1990) (also stating that admission of that evidence would have 
complied with FRE 404(b ), anyway, because it was offered to 
show law enforcement defendants' knowledge that a third 
person, whom they allowed to beat a prisoner, was violent). 
87 696 F.2d 1277, 1279-81 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 909 (1983). 
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cited Krezdorn. 
In United States v. Morano,88 the Eleventh Circuit 
court of appeals again stated that FRE 404(b) was 
inapplicable with regard to evidence of prior arsons of the 
''torch" whom the accused had allegedly hired to commit 
the charged arson, offered by the prosecution to show 
modus operandi, identity, and common plan with the 
accused. The court explicitly relied on "dictum" in 
Krezdorn as support for its conclusion. 89 But the court 
explained that the same principles that underlie FRE 404(b ), 
regarding special relevance, should be followed in applying 
FRE 40390 and affirmed the decision not to exclude the 
evidence under FRE 403 (the Sessoms dissent would 
have followed this approach). 
Clearly, none of these cases provides strong support 
for Sessoms. Moreover, the stated rationale of Sessoms 
-- to protect only "the accused" against unfair prejudice -
- is not at all advanced by more freely admitting this "other 
acts" evidence offered by the prosecution as part of its 
case: quite the contrary. 
(2) Evidence of Others' Acts, Offered or Admitted 
by the Accused 
The cases in which, like Sessoms, the accused is the 
party offering the "other acts" evidence regarding third 
persons, are not nearly as one-sided as the Sessoms 
majority asserts. The United States Court of Appeals for 
88 697 F.2d 923,926 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 
89 !d. 
90 Id. ("[A]lthough Rule 404(b) does not control this situation, 
the exceptions listed in the Rule should be considered in 
weighing the balance between the relevancy of this evidence 
and its prejudice under Rule 403. In this case, the arson at 
[defendant's business] and the arson for which [the torch] was 
convicted bear such striking similarities as to 'mark them as the 
handiwork of the same individual.' United States v. Goodwin, 
492 F.2d 1141, 1154 (5th Cir. 1974); cfFed.R.Evid. 404(b) 
(evidence of plan or identity)"). 
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the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. McCourf 1 
is the most thoughtful of the cases holding FRE 404(b) 
applicable to such "other acts" evidence concerning 
persons other than the accused, but it does not stand alone. 
Three other federal courts of appeal and appellate courts 
in three states concur with McCourt. 
(a) Cases Contra to Sessoms 
In McCourt, in an opinion authored by Judge Rymer, 
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's exclusion, 
under FRE 404(b ), of evidence offered by the accused 
that a third person had committed other crimes and 
therefore had likely committed the charged crimes. The 
court of appeals found that the proffered evidence was 
merely of propensity (i.e., in Maryland's phrase, it had no 
"special relevance") and was properly excluded. The court 
reviewed many ofthe decisions cited in Sessoms, as well 
as others, and pointed out their shortcomings. Judge 
Rymer pointed out: 
While [the appellant] correctly notes that several 
opinions "state" that Rule 404(b) applies to acts 
committed by the defendant, none holds that it 
applies only to the defendant. 
Most circuits which have commented on the 
applicability of Rule 404(b) to prior acts of 
persons other than the defendant draw on dicta 
from United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 
1327 (5th Cir. 1981).92 
McCourt cited favorably three decisions ofthe Fifth and 
Third Circuits that had affirmed the exclusion, under FRE 
404(b ), of evidence of"other crimes" by persons other 
91 925 F.2d 1229(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 837 (1991). 
Accord United States v. Spencer, 1 F.3d 742, 744-45 (9th Cir. 
1992) (no abuse of discretion in precluding defendant charged 
with being convicted felon in possession of firearm, based on 
gun seized from owner's automobile in which defendant was 
passenger, from presenting evidence of unrelated arrest and 
seizure of another handgun from car owner in another car). 
92 925 F.2d at 1233. 
than the accused.93 
In 1983 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the exclusion, under 
FRE 404(b ), of evidence of a non-accused's other acts, 
that would have been favorable to the defense. The 
defendants were charged with conspiracy to commit 
extortion regarding a rape allegedly committed on one of 
them by the government's witness. The government's 
witness testified that the sexual act had been consensual. 
The trial court refused to permit the defense to prove that 
the witness had previously raped other persons, in order 
to show that he had raped the defendant. The appellate 
court affirmed, stating that "the defendants' purpose in 
attempting to introduce such evidence was precisely what 
is forbidden under this rule [FRE 404(b)] ."94 
The Third Circuit also a:trmned the exclusion of third 
persons' "other acts" evidence offered by the defense. In 
a 1983 drug case, the informant testified for the 
government. The defendant, who argued that he had been 
entrapped by the informant's convincing him to get drugs, 
offered evidence of previous fraudulent schemes by the 
informant, to show that the informant had been duplicitous 
with others and thus with the accused. 95 The trial court 
was held to have correctly excluded the evidence, under 
both FRE 404(b) and 608(b ), as well as to have excluded 
it as cumulative when it was offered for impeachment 
purposes. 
In a 1982, per curiam decision, the Third Circuit 
similarly held that the district court had properly applied 
FRE 404(b) to exclude evidence of a government witness s 
involvement in a past scheme, when there was no evidence 
that the defendant had been the victim of a similar scheme.% 
McCourt also quotes four leading treatises on the 
Federal Rules ofEvidence, the authors of which all agree 
that FRE 404(b) applies to acts of persons other than the 
93 !d. at 1235. 
94 United States v. Reed, 715 F.2d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 1983). 
95 United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757,762 (3d Cir. 1983). 
96 United States v. Sturm, 671 F.2d 749, 751 (3d Cir.1982) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 842 (1982). 
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accused.97 
Subsequent to McCourt, state appellate courts in 
Michigan,98 Nebraska,99 and Ohio100 have followed 
McCourt on this issue. In addition, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit101 has twice ruled 
contrary to Sessoms. 
97 925 F.2d at 1232 n.2 (quoting 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, 
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140, at 1 75 (rev. ed. 1985); 2 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, EVIDENCE 'IJ404(04], at 404-39-40 (1989); 
WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE§ 404.4, § 404.12, at 80, 88 
(1987); 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE§ 5239, at457-58 (1978)). 
98 People v. Catanzarite, 536 N.W.2d 570, 572-73 (Mich. App. 
1995) (defendant must comply with Rule 404(b) when offering 
other crimes evidence regarding third person; under facts, no 
abuse of discretion in excluding evidence); People v. Rockwell, 
470N.W.2d673, 674-75 (1991) (per curiam) (semble). 
99 State v. Gardner, 498 N.W2d 605, 609-10 (Neb. App. 1993) 
(propensity evidence offered by defendant to show that third 
person had committed charged child molestation was properly 
excluded under Rule 404(b)). 
100 State v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 932, 950-51 (Ohio 1998) (some 
evidence offered by defense qualified under Rule 404(b ), e.g., 
to explain blood in car, and some did not). 
101 United States v. Hart, 70 F. 3d 854, 859 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(evidence of alleged accomplice's prior deceptions of FBI and 
IRS agents in unrelated case was inadmissible in defendant's 
prosecution for embezzlement and filing false income tax 
returns, when defendant offered it to show that accomplice's 
past success in conning federal agents made it more likely that 
he would have succeeded in conning defendant in instant 
case; "As [the accomplice] was neither the accused, a victim, 
nor a witness in this case, none of the Rule 404(b) exceptions 
would permit the introduction of the proffered character 
evidence"), reh 'gdenied, cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1127 (1996); 
United States v. Peters, 15 F. 3d 540,545 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(excluding, under FRE 404(b ), allegations that police officer had 
previously planted cocaine on suspect in unrelated case for 
prosecution for possession and conspiracy to possess crack 
cocaine with intent to distribute was not abuse of discretion, in 
absence of evidence that officer had opportunity to plant drugs 
in instant case), reh 'g denied, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 883 (1994). 
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(b) Cases Supportive of Sessoms: Defense of 
Mistaken Identity 
On the other side of the scales, decisions from 
three states, cited by Sessoms, have held that FRE 404(b) 
does not apply to evidence of acts of third persons. These 
cases involved evidence offered by the accused in support 
of a defense of mistaken identity. 
(i) Cases Supporting Sessoms 
Four of these cases -- from Colorado and New 
Jersey -- involved defenses of misidentification by 
eyewitnesses; evidence of the third person's similar acts 
was offered to identifY him, rather than the accused, as 
the perpetrator of the charged crime. 102 Another case, 
from Massachusetts, involved the defendant's offering 
evidence ofhis having been misidentified earlier by another 
victim, in another case. 103 
102 People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916,918-20 (Colo. 1982) (but no 
error in exclusion under facts of case), appeal dismissed, 459 
U.S. 803(1982); People v. Bueno, 626 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1981) (evidence should have been admitted); State v. 
Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 388 A.2d 587 (1978) (remanding, however, 
to determine strength of defendant's proffer; defendant wanted 
to show that similar crimes had been committed at times for 
which he had alibis, to show that he had been misidentified) 
(see also discussion of other jurisdictions' cases, 388 A.2d at 
591-92) (note that three dissenting justices would not have 
remanded; of these, two would have affirmed, and one 
reversed, the conviction); State v. Williams, 214 N.J. Super. 12, 
20, 518 A.2d 234, 238 (App. Div. 1986). See also Winfield v. 
United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. App. 1996) (reversible error to 
exclude evidence). See generally Annot., Admissibility of 
Evidence of Commission of Similar Crime by One Other Than 
Accused, 22 A.L.R.5th (1994). 
103 Commonwealth v. Jewett, 392 Mass. 558, 563,467 N.E.2d 155, 
158 (1984) (earlier misidentification of defendant as to another 
crime, where defendant could not have committed it). The 
evidence in Jewett would not seem to fit the "identity" route 
for substantive evidence in FRE 404(b ), yet the appellate 
court puzzlingly stated that the evidence did not come in to 
impeach the second victim's identification -- suggesting, 
therefore, that the evidence was substantive. 
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The courts in these cases seemed to feel constrained 
to avoid FRE 404(b) so as to lower the bar for the degree 
of distinctiveness that the defendant would have to show 
in order to make the "other crimes" evidence sufficiently 
similar to the charged crime. They overlooked the fact 
that the language of the Rule does not require such 
distinctiveness. The degree of distinctiveness is merely a 
factor, instead, in the balancing of probative value versus 
the risk of unfair prejudice. The Colorado, New Jersey, 
and Massachusetts courts could have reached the same 
result, as to admissibility, under FRE 404(b ), coupled 
with FRE 403 (i.e., two parts ofthe Faulkner-5-404(b) 
tripartite analysis). 
(ii) A 404(b) Approach Was Possible 
Thus, the better approach, leading to the same result, 
would have been to resolve these cases under FRE 
404(b ), by finding the evidence admissible to prove 
"identity," if the other crimes were sufficiently similar 
to the charged crime so as to have enough probative 
value to be worthy of admission. 104 Several other cases 
not cited in Sessoms -- from the District of Columbia 
and from Maryland's Court of Special Appeals --
properly have affirmed the exclusion of such evidence 
when it lacks sufficiently strong probative value to have 
the necessary "special relevance" under 404(b ). 105 Both 
104 See Gates v. United States, 481 A.2d 120, 124-25 (D.C. 
App. 1984) (no abuse of discretion in excluding hearsay 
evidence offered by defense regarding a rape, of which rape 
defendant was wrongly accused, for purposes of arguing that 
defendant had a look-alike who was a rapist, where the proffer 
lacked details as to modus operandi, characteristics of the 
victim, and time of day), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 (1985). 
105 Jamison v. United States, 600 A.2d 65,69-70 (D.C. App. 
1991) (evidence that defendant's son, who lived elsewhere but 
visited defendant's house regularly, had been seen in 
possession of cocaine outside of house, was properly excluded 
in narcotics prosecution based on discovery of cocaine in 
house, absent evidence of temporal connection); Johnson v. 
State, 4 Md. App. 648, 244 A.2d 632 (1968) (proper to have 
excluded evidence of witness's prior conviction for possession 
of barbiturates, which would have been admissible only with 
regard to impeachment of credibility of witness and would have 
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and 
Third Circuits in the Stevens106 and Aboumoussallem107 
cases, cited favorably in Sessoms, have held that a 
defendant is free to offer "reverse 404(b )" evidence 
concerning another person, to identify that person as the 
perpetrator of the charged crime, as long as its probative 
value is not substantially outweighed by FRE 403 
considerations. 
c. Half and Half: Aboumoussallem and Stevens 
Provided Greater Protection for the Accused, But 
Utilized Both FRE 404(b) and 403 
The Second and the Third Circuits have applied both 
FRE 404(b) and 403 to "other acts" evidence offered by 
the accused regarding another person. In 
Aboumoussallem, decided in 1984 by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the accused's 
defense was that he had been duped into carrying drugs. 
He offered evidence that his coconspirators had duped 
others, on the theory that it was admissible under FRE 
404(b) to show that they had duped him as part of a 
"common plan."108 The court of appeals stated that the 
been collateral and irrelevant to issue of innocence of 
defendant, who claimed that witness, and not defendant, was 
participant in the charged crime). See also supra note 104. 
106 United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1384, 1401-07 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (reversible error to exclude evidence that victim of 
very similar crime, who was of same race as his assailant, did 
not identify defendant, to show that eyewitness of another race 
had misidentified defendant in charged crime; evidence 
qualified under FRE 404(b) and 403). 
107 726 F.2d 906 (2dCir. 1984)(cited in Sessoms, 357 Md. at287-
88, 744 A.2d at 17). 
108 Id. at 911. 
109 !d. ("Whether or not evidence concerning a co-
conspirator's 'plan' to inform his couriers could be introduced 
by a prosecutor to prove a defendant's knowledge, we believe 
the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant offers 
similar acts evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as 
when a prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword"). 
Articles 
trial court had erred not in applying FRE 404(b) at all, 
but in applying the same standard, under FRE 404(b ), to 
exculpatory evidence of "other crimes" of third parties 
relevant to the accused's defense, as it would to evidence 
of the accused's similar acts, offered by the govemment. 109 
The court of appeals reasoned that "when the defendant 
offers similar acts evidence of a third party to prove some 
fact pertinent to the defense, ... the only issue arising under 
Rule 404(b) is whether the evidence is relevant to the 
existence or non-existence of some fact pertinent to the 
defense." 110 Thus, the court chose to apply an 
"asymmetric" standard under FRE 404(b ), depending on 
whether the evidence was offered by or against the 
defendant. 111 
Nonetheless, on the facts before it, the court of 
appeals in Aboumoussallem affirmed the exclusion of 
the exculpatory evidence under FRE 403 on the grounds 
oflow probative value as to "common scheme," trial delay, 
and potential jury confusion, 112 as not having been an 
abuse of discretion. 
In Stevens, on the other hand, the Third Circuit found 
that it was reversible error to have excluded the 
exculpatory evidence of similar crimes by a third person, 
as the proffered evidence survived both a FRE 404(b) 
and 403 analysis. 113 
110 Id. at 911-12 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
111 The Second Circuit relied on the fact that FRE 609, regarding 
impeachment of witnesses by their prior convictions, was 
asymmetric in its treatment of the accused versus other 
witnesses, explicitly providing (before its amendment in 1990) 
for consideration only of a prejudicial effect to the defendant. 
!d. at 912 n.5. In this author's opinion, the fact that FRE 609 is 
explicit in such treatment, and FRE 404(b) is not is, to the 
contrary, clear evidence that FRE 404(b) itself was not intended 
to treat accuseds and non-accuseds differently. Any desirable 
flexibility may be accommodated via FRE 403. 
112 Id. at 912 n.5. 
113 935 F.2dat 1107. 
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d. The Sessoms Court Should Have Held that the 
Trial Judge Correctly Found that Rule 5-404(b) 
Applied 
The court of appeals' decision in Sessoms involved 
evidence that was offered by the defense. The court may 
have thought it was "helping" criminal defendants by 
holding that Rule 5-404(b) applies only with regard to 
evidence of other acts by an accused. But the court did 
not restrict its decision to evidence offered by the accused. 
Sessoms' plain language applies equally to free the 
government from the strictures of Rule 5-404(b) when it 
offers "other acts" evidence regarding co-conspirators or 
defense witnesses other than the accused. Certainly a 
criminal accused might suffer unfair prejudice from such 
evidence. 114 
The policy reasons underlying FRE 404 and Md. 
Rule 5-404 support the application ofFRE 404(b) and 
Rule 5-404(b) to all persons' "other acts," no matter 
by whom offered. Only if the "other acts" evidence 
has some "special relevance" should the trial court 
admit it; to hold otherwise would waste precious court 
time and confuse and distract the fact-finder, as well 
as risk unfairly prejudicing one or the other party's 
case. 
e. A Better Path Would Be to Limit Faulkner 
It may be that the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
114 See, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 604 n.11 
(11th Cir. 1990) ("The plain language of Rule 404(b) refers to 
'persons,' not 'defendants,' and Rule 404(a) carves out specific 
exceptions relating to the 'accused,' 'victim[s],' and 
'witness[es].' Where, as in Morano and this case, the non-
defendant's 'extraneous' act, if proved, directly supports the 
guilt ofthe defendant as to the crime charged, that 'extraneous' 
act should not, it seems, be subject to proof through the 
improper character-evidence route condemned by Rule 404"); 
United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 671, rehearing denied 
(1Oth Cir. 1989) (evidence of unlawful acts in connection with 
business that was predecessor to one involved in prosecution 
was not admissible against defendant where evidence 
concerned bad acts of defendant's other associates, not 
defendant, and was not sufficiently tied to him). See also supra 
notes 84-90 and accompanying text. 
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did not want to impose the high Faulkner standard of 
"clear and convincing evidence" on an accused who 
wished to offer exculpatory evidence-- in Sessoms, of 
a third person's other acts. This problem, however, 
would be better solved in a way other than making 
Rule 5-404(b) altogether inapplicable to acts of persons 
other than the accused. 
First, the court could have reasonably held that, for 
policy reasons, the Faulkner gloss regarding "clear and 
convincing evidence" applies only when the "other acts" 
evidence is offered against a criminal accused. There are 
good reasons to single out the accused for special 
protection from the risk of unfair prejudice, as well as not 
to erect too high a bar against the accused's admission of 
relevant evidence in his or her defense. 115 This approach 
would have been the easiest one to take. 
Another, more intellectually attractive possibility 
would have been to overrule that part ofF aulkner which 
requires "clear and convincing evidence" of the other acts, 
leaving the strength of proof as a factor in Faulkner's 
final step of balancing probative value versus 
competing considerations. This approach would put 
Maryland squarely in line with the federal cases, 116 
such as McCourt andAboumoussallem, that apply FRE 
404(b) and then FRE 403. Indeed, Maryland followed 
this same approach in Rule 5-609, when it rejected as 
unnecessary FRE 609( a)( 1) 's explicitly asymmetric 
115 E.g., State v. Garfole, 388 A.2d 587, 591 (N.J. 1978) ("[A] 
lower standard of degree of similarity of offenses may justly be 
required of a defendant using other-crimes evidence 
defensively than is exacted from the State when such evidence 
is used incriminatorily"). See United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 
1380, 1384, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991 )("When a defondant proffers 
'other crimes' evidence under Rule 404(b ), there is no 
possibility of prejudice to the defendant; therefore, the other 
crime need not be a 'signature' crime. Instead, it only need be 
sufficiently similar to the crime at bar so that it is relevant under 
Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 402, and that its probative value is not 
substantially outweighed by Fed.R.Evid. 403 considerations"). 
116 See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) 
(proponent need only provide sufficient evidence to support 
fact-finder's reasonable finding offact that the alleged actor 
committed the act). 
treatment of accuseds and other witnesses, with regard 
to impeachment by prior conviction, because the role 
of the witness will affect the trial court's determination 
of the degree of risk of unfair prejudice. 117 
3. Sessoms Majority Both Misconstrues Rule 5-
616(b)(3) and Overlooks the Hearsay Rule 
The Sessoms majority misinterpreted Rule 5-
616(b )(3)1 18 when it held that evidence ofthe allegation 
of a robbery of a third person by the victim's brother, a 
few hours after the defendant's alleged rape of the victim 
and the defendant's being beaten by the brother and his 
friend, should have been admitted to show a "motive to 
lie"119 on the part ofthe victim and the brother, both of 
whom testified at trial. 
a. The Brother'sAIIeged Robbery of a Third Person 
Provided No Motive to Falsely Claim that the 
Defendant Had Raped the Victim 
Rule 5-616(a)(3) permits evidence of other acts 
that directly create a motive to testify falsely in the 
case before the court, as was the situation in the United 
117 Mo. RuLE 5-609(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted 
of a crime shall be admitted if ... (2) the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to 
the witness or the objecting party. 
118 Mo. RuLE 5-616(b )(3) provides: "Extrinsic evidence of bias, 
prejudice, interest, or other motive to testify falsely may be 
admitted whether or not the witness has been examined about 
the impeaching fact and has failed to admit it." 
119 357Md.at292, 744A.2dat19. 
120 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) ("A more particular attack on the 
witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination 
directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or 
ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to 
issues or personalities in the case at hand"); Ebb v. State, 341 
Md. 578,589 & n.2, 671 A.2d 974,980 & n.2 (1996). 
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States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska. 120 
There the government's principal witness's juvenile 
probationary status was held to be relevant to show 
his motive to shift the blame for the charged crime 
from himself to the defendant. Had the witness been 
charged with the crime, he would have been 
incarcerated. His probationary status "upped the 
stakes" for the witness with regard to the outcome of 
the particular case before the court. 
In Sessoms, the defendant testified to facts suggesting 
that the victim's brother beat and robbed him and that the 
victim and her brother concocted the rape allegation as a 
cover-up for that robbery. The trial court properly 
admitted that evidence as relevant to the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of the alleged rape. 
But the court of appeals went too far in holding that 
it was error to exclude evidence of another alleged robbery 
by the brother. This robbery had nothing to do with the 
defendant. Its alleged commission gave the victim and 
her brother no reason to falsely accuse the defendant 
of anything. 
Its only relevance would be as pure propensity 
evidence. The logical progression would have to be 
that (1) the brother robbed the third person, therefore 
(2) it is more likely that he robbed the defendant, too. 
And if the accusation is offered for its truth, as it had 
For an example of a case where the proffered evidence 
was insufficiently related to the pending case to be admissible 
under Davis, see, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 598 F.Supp. 469, 
4 7 4-7 5 (D .Me. 1984) (court having provided two opportunities 
for defense counsel to examine prosecution witness to show, as 
foundation, any potential bias on his part resulting from 
unrelated, pending indictment against such witness, evidence 
of pending homicide charge against witness was properly 
excluded as irrelevant), aff'd, 766 F.2d 609,615 (1st Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 4 7 4 U.S. 923 ( 1985), post-conviction relief denied, 
763 F.Supp. 658,666 (D. Me. 1991), aff'd, 965 F.2d 1184,1185 (1st 
Cir. 1992), dismissal of post-conviction relief affirmed, 178 F. 3d 
34,57 (l st Cir. 1999). See also United States v. Young, 952 F.2d 
1252, 1259 (lOth Cir. 1991) (whether employer accused former 
employee of embezzlement was collateral to whether another 
employee committed bank fraud, and, thus, former employee's 
testimony was inadmissible to refute employer's denial that he 
accused former employee of embezzlement). 
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to be, to logically help to prove what it is offered to 
prove, then, as Judge Wilner pointed out in dissent, it 
is a "rank hearsay accusation . . . [properly] excluded 
because it was hearsay, irrelevant, and, on balance, 
unduly prejudicial to the State."121 
b. Even if the Court Had Been Correct that the 
Evidence Was Relevant to Impeachment, It Was 
Cumulative, and Its Exclusion Was an Appropriate 
Exercise of the Trial Court's Discretion 
The only remotely plausible non-propensity 
argument for admission of any of the scenario 
regarding the accusation of a second robbery --
although it is one not made by the court -- is that the 
victim's subsequent retraction of her identification of 
her brother is somehow a "prior bad act" relevant to 
her character for truthfulness that she may be asked 
121 357 Md. at 296, 744 A.2d at 21 (Wilner, J., dissenting, 
joined by Rodowsky and Raker, JJ.). 
122 Rule 5-608(b ), by its clear terms, does not permit extrinsic 
evidence, such as the police officer's testimony, had it been 
sought in Sessoms. Rule 5-608(b) provides: 
The court may permit any witness to be examined regarding the 
witness's own prior conduct that did not result in a conviction 
but that the court finds probative of a character trait of 
untruthfulness. Upon objection, however, the court may permit 
the inquiry only if the questioner, outside the hearing of the 
jury, establishes a reasonable factual basis for asserting that 
the conduct of the witness occurred. The conduct may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence. (Emphasis added). 
123 The case that supports this reading of Rule 5-608(b) is 
another rape case, State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 468 A.2d 319 
(1983), where a rape conviction was reversed, because the 
defense counsel had not been permitted to ask the victim about 
her alleged earlier recantation on cross-examination in another 
trial of her testimony on direct in that trial, accusing another of 
assault. Ironically, on retrial, the defense was unable to deliver 
what it had promised. Second Conviction in Rape Case, 
BALTIMORE EvENING SUN, Apr. 10, 1984, at B 12, col. 3 ("The 
matter was not brought up at the retrial because it was 
subsequently learned that the perjury incident never 
occurred .... "). 
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about on cross-examination, 122 in the trial court's 
discretion under Rule 5-608(b ), to impeach her. 123 
Under the facts, even this argument is not compelling. 
She did not lie: she simply said she would not say if 
the man pointed out was her brother. The trial court's 
exclusion of the evidence would not have been an abuse 
of discretion under Rule 5-608(b ), even if it had been 
offered under that Rule. 
Moreover, the trial court admitted evidence of the 
victim's initial identification of her brother and of her 
subsequent statement, "I ain't saying ifhe is my brother or 
he isn't." Certainly its exclusion of the third person's 
tangential, intervening accusation ought not to have been 
held to be an abuse of discretion. The jury had already 
learned of the sister's loyalty to the brother and the 
brother's prior robbery convictions for other robberies, 
and the excluded evidence would have been merely 
cumulative. 124 
It was essentially this position that the Sessoms 
dissent took. Judge Wilner, joined by Judges Raker and 
Rodowsky, would have affirmed the trial court's line-
drawing as an appropriate exercise of its discretion 
under Rule 5-403. 125 The majority's refusal to do so-
-having taken away Rule 5-404(b)'s propensity rule, 
read Rule 5-616(b )(3) too broadly, and left the trial 
court empowered only with Rule 5-403 to exclude 
The federal courts do not share what seems to be 
Maryland's bent toward particularly liberal admissibility of prior 
statements by rape victims regarding unrelated cases. United 
States v. Withorn, 204 F. 3d 790,795 (8th Cir. 2000) (allegedly 
false prior rape accusations by victim are inadmissible under 
either FRE 412 or 608(b) ). 
124 See, e.g., United States v. Delfonso, 707 F.2d 757,762 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
125 357 Md. at 294-302, 744 A.2d at 21-25 (Wilner, J., dissenting, 
joined by Rodowsky and Raker, JJ.). 
126 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 115 F.3d 361,365 (6th Cir. 
1997) (in prosecution of inmate for mailing threatening message 
to President and Vice President of United States, trial court 
properly excluded "distracting and immaterial collateral 
allegations" against prison guards, through which inmate 
unhelpful evidence -- unduly curtails the trial judges' 
gatekeeping role in monitoring the admission of 
evidence. 
More fundamentally, it loses sight of the purpose of 
the rules of evidence in the criminal trial system: fairness 
and justice to all defendants, victims, and witnesses. 126 
The following excerpt from Boyd v. United States, 
quoted by the court of appeals in Wynn, regarding other 
crimes there by the accused, can just as easily be 
applied to the danger of unfair prejudice against the 
rape victim and her brother in Sessoms: 
Whether Standley robbed Brinson and Mode, 
and whether he and Boyd robbed Hall, were 
matters wholly apart from the inquiry as to the 
murder of Dansby. They were collateral to the 
issue to be tried .... Proof of them only tended 
to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to 
draw their minds away from the real issue, and 
to produce the impression that they were 
wretches whose lives were of no value to the 
community, and who were not entitled to the full 
benefit ofthe rules prescribed by law .... " 127 
Putting the victim on trial is a time-honored defense 
strategy. 128 Sessoms facilitates general character 
attacks on victims and their families, tending to portray 
them as undeserving of protection. 
The Sessoms majority reversed the trial court, 
"improperly sought to gamer the jurors' sympathy for 
himself, and inflame them against the authorities"). 
127 142 U.S. 450,457-58 (1892)(quoted in ff)lnn, 351 Md. at 311, 
718 A.2d at 589-90). 
128 E.g., United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597,604 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
129 357 Md. at 302-03,744 A.2d at 25 ("The only possible basis 
for [the alleged second robbery victim's] hearsay statement, to 
show propensity for violence or robbery on the part of [the 
rape victim's brother] would be as an attack on his credibility, 
allowed by Rule 5-607. As noted, however, [the brother's] past 
Articles 
apparently because the majority thought that the rape 
victim and her brother might have lied about the rape. 
criminal record was fully exposed to the jury. He admitted to 
being convicted of armed robbery in 1997, of robbery 
committed the day after the alleged rape of [his sister], and of 
robbery committed in 1988. What [the third person's] 
unsubstantiated hearsay accusation would have added to this 
attack on [the brother's] credibility is a mystery to me. Rule 5-
403, which sits atop nearly all rules of admissibility, provides 
that even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice or by considerations of needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. The trial judge determined that [the third 
person's] accusation was irrelevant and, to the extent it had 
any probative value, that value was outweighed by undue 
prejudice to the State. That is quintessentially a judgment call, 
to which great deference is due .... ") (Wilner, J., dissenting, 
joined by Rodowsky and Raker, JJ.). 
130 After all: 
"[Important coordinate factors, highly material to 
the sound administration of the trial process, require 
appraisal along with the factor of the degree of 
relevance of defendant's proffered proofs .... 
Defendant's proffer ... does create the possibility 
of undue consumption of time and of danger that 
the jury might be confused or misled .... 
Defendant's proofs of the other occurrences ... 
would generate ... mini-trials as to the truth of those 
claims." 
State v. Garfole, 388 A.2d 587,592-93 (N.J. 1978). See, e.g., 
United States v. Westbrook, 125 F. 3d 996, 1006-08 (7th Cir.1997) 
(no abuse of discretion in excluding some of defendant's 
evidence of gang affiliation ofthird parties, offered by 
defendant to explain his fear of reprisals, in drug conspiracy 
prosecution; defendant was permitted to testifY that his alleged 
confederate was gang member, that gang's members were 
dangerous, and no relationship was drawn between charged 
conspiracy and gang membership), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1036, 
118 S.Ct. 643 (1997); United States v. Pascarella, 84 F. 3d 61, 70 
(2d Cir. 1996) (proper to have excluded some evidence proffered 
by defendant to show that codefendant had duped him into 
depositing stolen checks in his personal account; excluded 
evidence was repetitive, inadmissible hearsay, confusing, or of 
only marginal relevance; defendant was permitted to present 
considerable evidence on claim; much of excluded evidence 
could have led to "trial within a trial" on whether codefendant 
31.1 U. Bait. L.F. 27 
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The jury had ample impeachment evidence with which 
to gauge the credibility of the victim and her brother. 
As Judge Wilner aptly pointed out, 129 the majority 
should have stepped back and respected the trial judge's 
appropriate exercise of discretion, 130 even though it 
may not have been the same ruling the appellate judges 
would have made, had they sat as trial judges. 
Arming the trial courts only with Rule 5-403 opens 
too wide a window for evidence of other acts of persons 
other than the accused, whether offered by the defense or 
the prosecution. The court of appeals would be better 
advised to simply remove the Faulkner "clear and 
convincing evidence" standard from the application ofRule 
5-404(b). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Four recent decisions by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland have unduly burdened trial courts in their rulings 
regarding "other acts" evidence. Unnecessary reversals 
will result from rtjlnn 's refusal to evaluate whether the 
trial court's decision was justified on a ground not stated 
explicitly at the trial level. The same is true of Streater's 
requirements that the trial judge, having ruled correctly on 
the stated objection, rule sua sponte under Rule 5-404(b) 
and then provide a detailed Faulkner analysis on the 
record. Klauenberg's misapplication of the Rule is 
sure to add to the confusion. 
Contrary to the majority federal law, Sessoms 
leaves the courts unable to use Rule 5-404(b) in 
had duped defendant and others in past by depositing checks in 
their accounts without their knowledge); United States v. 
Sanchez, 74 F.3d 562,566-67 (5th Cir. 1996) (in prosecution of 
police officer for violating civil rights of prostitutes by using 
threat of arrest to coerce them to perform sexual acts, no abuse 
of discretion to exclude testimony of another officer that 
prostitute who had no association with victims told him that he 
"would be next," where there was no evidence that any of 
officer's victims conspired to conjure charges against him and 
there was substantial and corroborated evidence of officer's 
guilt); United States v. Sellers, 906 F.2d 597, 602-03 (11th Cir. 
1990) (affirming exclusion of evidence proffered by defense as 
appropriate exercises of trial court's discretion under FRE 
608(b), 609(a)(1), and403). 
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analyzing "other acts" evidence in criminal cases 
concerning acts of persons other than the accused. Far 
better to apply Rule 5-404(b ), which provides a route 
for the admission of sufficiently probative "other acts" 
evidence, remove the Faulkner gloss requiring clear 
and convincing proof of those acts, and rely on the 
trial courts' application of Rule 5-403 to exclude 
insufficiently probative evidence, regardless which 
party offers it. 
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